













 The purpose of this series of papers, starting with the current work, is to 
critically examine metaphysics of Heidegger's philosophy of technology 
(Technik), and to question the kind of “arts of existence” in the Foucauldian 
sense. I consider the possibility of overcoming nihilism in “art (Kunst)”, in 
contrast to "technique (Technik)", which Heidegger dealt with in a lecture on 
The Question Concerning Technology (Die Frage nach der Technik) (1953). 
Heidegger argued that “art of technology (Kunst)” provides effective way to 
overcome modern nihilism. Depending on his most favorite poet Friedrich 
Hölderlin’s paradoxical words, Heidegger thought that the most critical 
situation should be salvaged. In other words, he believed that if our world fell 
into the most critical situation of nihilism due to technology (Technik), it must 
be saved by art of technology (Kunst). Relying on Canadian sociologist Arthur 
Kroker’s The Will to Technology and the Culture of Nihilism: Heidegger, Nietzsche, 
Marx (2004), I examine the philosophy of contemporary art and technology, in 
order to relativize the “art of technology (Kunst)” assumed by Heidegger and his 
philosophy of technology itself.
 Kroker argues that Heidegger's metaphysics of technology should be 
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adopted in order to overcome the present nihilism. According to Kroker, 
"completed nihilism" in which nihilism is realized in a perfect form is called 
“hyper-nihilism.” According to him, Nietzsche predicted that the age of nihilism 
will arrive from the 19th century to the 2nd century. Kroker characterizes the 
present age as the age of “a passive resentment and a suicidal will to 
nothingness," and “the age of the storm of nihilism.” Moreover, according to 
Kroker, in the age of completed nihilism (hyper-nihilism) of “late modernity” in 
which we live, the economy, politics and even religion have undergone 
fundamental transformation; in our daily life “fundamental attunement (= 
profound boredom)” prevails. To properly illuminate the “logic which rules the 
culture and society” in the present age, where “the will to technology” reaches its 
summit, Kroker turns to Heidegger to examine the relationship between 
technology and (hyper-) nihilism. While the sum of Kroker’s insights into 
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology falls outside the scope of the present set of 
papers, I will focus on four specific points.
 First, I consider the metaphysics of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology 
(in particularly, the “Bremen” lecture (1949) delivered soon after World War II, 
the lecture titled “Building Dwelling Thinking (Bauen Whonen Denken)” (1951) 
at the Darmstadt Conference, and The Question Concerning Technology (Die 
Frage nach der Techinik (1953)). In doing so, I primarily focus on the question 
of Heidegger’s war responsibility and post-war responsibility that concerns his 
entire philosophy. I argue that Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is not only 
related to the political aspect in his philosophy, but is also based on an “anti-
humanistic inhumanism.” In that sense, I argue, it is problematic to criticize his 
philosophy from the viewpoint of “humanism.” 
 As is well-known, Heidegger suggested the possibility of overcoming 
“humanism” in his Über den Humanismus (Letter on Humanism) (1946). As 
Kroker points out, Heidegger’s philosophy showed signs of the idea of the “post-
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human.” It is therefore necessary to shift the ground of the discussion from the 
viewpoint of “humanism” to that of “post-humanism” in order to examine 
Heidegger's own war responsibility and post-war responsibility.
 Second, I re-read Heidegger’s “philosophy of technology” in the context of 
contemporary philosophies of technology. While contemporary philosophies or 
ethics of technologies seems to be based on anti-humanistic and non-humanistic 
post-human thought superficially, it is not as anti-humanistic as Heidegger’s 
“philosophy of technology,” and is not even non-humanistic. For example, 
Peter-Paul Verbeek, a contemporary philosopher of technology, discusses the 
ethics of technology in Moralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the 
Morality of Things (2011), and argues for a “moralization of technology.” While 
he claims that his position is beyond humanism, I argue that this is not the case, 
and Verbeek’s work is an extension of anti-humanism. I argue that his ethical 
position is not as radical as Heidegger’s. 
 I also examine Don Ihde’s philosophy of technology, which arrives at a 
post-phenomenological position through a critical reading of Husserl’s 
phenomenology and Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, and influences 
Verbeek’s ethics of technologyThird, I consider the problematic of “post-
human” thought in Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. In this context, I 
examine Peter Sloterdijk's Rules for the Human Zoo: a response to the Letter on 
Humanism (1999). According to Verbeek, Sloterdijk holds a position of “post-
phenomenology,” in which the post-human point of view is missing. However, I 
think the problem raised by Verbeek is not limited only to the post-
phenomenological position, but rather is nothing but the problem of post-
humanism held by Heidegger's philosophy. As Kroker points out, the post-
human problematic is potentially included in Heidegger’s metaphysical thinking 
of Technology. In this sense, it is necessary to consider Heidegger’s philosophy 
of technology in order to confirm the validity of Sloterdijk’s point of view. 
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Moreover, the essence of Heidegger's "post-human" philosophy of beyond 
humanism is non-human (inhuman). We need to examine Heidegger's Über den 
Humanismus to verify the validity of Sloterdijk’s criticism of Heidegger.
 Fourth, while Heidegger’s anti-human “post-human” thinking is non-
human, it is preparing Verbeek’s optimism of “moralizing technology” in a 
sense. It is considered that the danger of moralization of technology also possibly 
exists in the future. In my opinion, the moralization of technology not only 
bears a mutual relationship with the politicization of technology, but also 
presents the danger that morality may be eroded by the political. Moreover, it 
should be noted that technology and the technological may possibly intervene 
between the ethical and the political. As Heidegger also pointed out, technology 
and politics are closely related, and technology itself is political. 
 In the context of these questions, the current series of papers will address 
the links among the moralization of technology, the politicization of technology, 
as well as the aestheticization of technology. As Walter Benjamin already pointed 
out, the aestheticization of politics and the politicization of aesthetics arise from 
the same roots. Based on the dual meanings of the word technē in Greek, 
Heidegger interprets the German Kunst as technology on the one hand, and as 
art on the other hand. This inevitably results from the fact that, just as the 
Greek technē is inseparable from the Greek poíēsis, the German Technik 
(technique or technology) is inseparable from Kunst (art or technology). I argue 
that, though Heidegger aims to overcome hyper-nihilism through Kunst as art, 
it is possible that Kunst as technology will strengthen rather than overcome 
hyper-nihilism. This is because Kunst as technology and as art includes the 
possibility of generating hyper-nihilism by evoking the inseparable relationship 
between the aestheticization of technology and the politicization of technology.
 In the first paper in the series, I will focus on the first and second issues. 
Particularly, I first confirm the historical background that Heidegger's 
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philosophy of technology was conceived. What is interesting to me is that 
Heidegger gave lectures on technology (Technik or Kunst) at some organizations 
deeply related to arts and crafts. For Heidegger, the problem of technology 


































怠（＝深刻な退屈さ profound boredom）」という「根本気分（fundamental 
attunement）6」が蔓延している。































































































































ガ ー は、「 技 術 的 合 理 性 の 実 証 主 義（positivism of technological 
rationality）」に抗して、技術の背後にある「形而上学の本質的要素を
把握すること 13」を主張した。ハイデガーが「技術（テクノロジー）


































































命法の地平の外部（outside the horizon of the technological imperative）か
ら考えることによって初めて可能であり、遺伝子決定論の視点を超え
























































































































































































































己の実践（pratique de soi）の形成と発展のことなのです」。（Michel Foucault
（1984）、”Le souci de la vérite”, DITS ET ECRITS, Tome IV, p.675 （湯浅博雄訳 ,「真
実の気遣い」、『ミシェル・フーコー思考集成 X』所収、筑摩書房、2002年、p.165。
2 Martin Heidegger, Die Frage nach der Technik, in: Vorgräge und Aufsätze, Verlag Günter 
Neske, 1954. S. 13-44.また同書については、ハイデガー全集（Gesamtausgabe, 
Vittorio klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 以下 GAと略記）第七巻（GA7）S.5-36.
に再録されている。
3 Arthur Kroker, The Will to Technology & The Culture of Nihilism: Heidegger, Nietzsche & 





5 Arthur Kroker, op.cit., p. 4.（クローカー、邦訳、p. 7）。
6 Arthur Kroker, ibid., p.24.（クローカー、邦訳、p.39）。
7 Arthur Kroker, ibid., p. 14.（クローカー、邦訳、p.25）。
8 Cf. Arthur Kroker, The Will to Technology & The Culture of Nihilism: Heidegger, Nietzsche 




















（Fukuyama 2002, Habermas 2003, Kass 2002, President’s Council on Bioethics (U.S.) 
and Kass 2003）」（Nicolas Rose, The Politics of Life itself: Biomedicine, Power, and 




10 Cf. Peter-Paul Verbeek, Moralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the Morality 
of Things, The University of Chicago, 2011.（鈴木俊洋訳『技術の道徳化―事物
の道徳性を理解し設計する』、法政大学出版局、2015年）。





12 Cf. Peter Sloterdijk, Regeln für den Menschenpark, Ein Antwortschreiben zu Heideggers Brief 
über den Humanismus, Sonderdruck edition suhrkamp, 1999.（仲正昌樹編訳『「人間
園」の規則―ハイデッガーの『ヒューマニズム書簡』に対する返書』
御茶の水書房、2000年）。




15 Arthur Kroker, op.cit., p.11（クローカー、同書、p.21.）。
16 Arthur Kroker, ibid., p. 4.（クローカー、同書、p.7）。
17 Cf. Arthur Kroker, ibid., p. 4.（クローカー、同書、p.7）。
18 ニコラス・ローズの議論を参照せよ（Cf. N. Rose, The politics of Life itself: 
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20 Cf. Kimberly Young, Caught in the Net: How to Recognize the Signs of Internet Addiction---
and a Wining Strategy for Recovery, Wieley, 1998（小田嶋由美子訳『インターネット
中毒―まじめな警告です』、毎日新聞社、1998年）。
21 今更指摘するまでもないが、インターネットによる電子メールの交信や連絡









cybernetic organism）」と定義し、「機械と有機体の複合体（a hybrid of machine 
and organism）であり、社会のリアリティと同時にフィクションを生き抜く生
き物（a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction）」であるという。彼
女によれば、「社会のリアリティ」とは、「さまざまな実際に生きられた社会





optical illusion）にすぎない」と喝破している。（Cf. Donna J. Haraway, Simians, 
Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, Routledge, 1991. 特に第 8章「サイ
ボーグ宣言 : 二〇世紀後半の科学、技術、社会主義フェミニズム」（A Cyborg 
Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century, 
pp. 149-181）を参照のこと（高橋さきの訳『猿と女とサイボーグ』、青土社、
2000年、pp.286-348）。
23 Arthur Kroker, ibid., p.5. （クローカー、前掲書、p.9）。ただし、訳文は変えてある。















26 Arthur Kroker, ibid., p. 38.（クローカー、邦訳、p.62）。










29 Arthur Kroker, op.cit, p. 39.（クローカー、邦訳、p.63）。
30 Martin Heidegger, Gelassenheit, Heidegger Meßkircher Rede von 1955, Verlag Karl Alber, 















































理論家ウード・クルターマンの『芸術論小史』（Udo Kultermann, Kleine 
Geschichte der Kusttheorie, Wissenschaftliche Buchgeselschaft, Darmstadt, 1987. 神林常
道・太田喬夫訳『芸術論の歴史』、勁草書房、1993年）で触れられている。「特
色的なことは、スペインのこの哲学者〔オルテガ〕とハイデガーとのダルムシュ
タットでの出会い（1951年 8月 5日）が彼の生涯における絶頂点とみなされ
ていることである。この出会いはオルテガについて書かれた伝記の一つに見
出すことができる」（クルターマン、邦訳 p.234）。またクルターマンは、ハイ
デガーの「芸術論」（『芸術作品の根源』や「技術への問い」など）を高く評
価し、オルテガの芸術論がハイデガーの芸術論から大きな影響を受けている
ことを指摘している。
